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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

BRIGHAM G. HOLBROOK and
BE'r11 1 HOLBROOK, his wife,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

vs.

Case No.

11767

\\'lLLIAM M. HODSON and ROSE B.
HODSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appella;nts.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NA'rURE OF THE CASE
This was an action for specific performance of a
eontract for salt> of apartment house and adjoining duplex in Salt Lake Cit)·, Utah, based on an earnest money
rec(•i pt and agreement.

2

DISPOSrr [ON 1

COUR'I 1

'rhe Di::shict Court JieJd ;.;pe('ifi(' pt>rforrnanc(_' not
appropriate and awardL·cl damages in the form of return
of earrn st rnont'Y dqiosi t d<rn·n J ict,\'lll<'nt from escrow,
$800.00 per month for one year, value of 1\·asher-dryer,
attorneys fees and interest.
1

NA11URE OF RELJgF t-;OUUH'r ON APPEAL
Respondents seelrn dismi:ssa] of t11e appeal as not
tinwl>T filed and a recornputation of damages a"·arded to
include the period to the date of judgment, or, in tJ1e
alternative, that tlw jndgment be ::mstained except for
the foregoing recomputation.
S'l1ATEl\1ENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS
Commencing January 1, 1967, Mr. Holbrook attempted to occupy the properties, posted rental signs,
purchased a washer and dryer for the apartment house,
and attempted to assist in the collection of rent, but occupancy of the iiremises ·was refused. (R. 98, 99, 111, 113)
A complete down payment of $20,000.00 was made and
"Tas still in (:'Scrow at time of trial and had never been
tendered hack to the Plaintiffs. (R. 103 and 108) Mr.
Holbrook discussed his plans for the use of the property
vvith l\fr. Collins (R. 109), and l\fr. Collins discussed
these plans with Mr. Hodson. (R. H:i2, 163) Mr. Hodson
denied that he had a conver:sation ·with Mr. Collins with
regard to l\Ir. Holbrook's plans to move the duplex and
build apartments, bnt clicl ::state that he did inquire w11at

3
Holbrook ,,·as going to do with the lJroperty. (R. 148,
1+9) He further stated that he didn't require Mr. Hol]Jrook to set forth what lie was going to do with the
property an<l didn't require a breakdown of the subordination at the time he signed the earnest money receipt,
though he had read tl1e said <'arnest money receipt bel'ore he lia<l sigm•d it. (R. 145, 147) Further, Mrs. Hodson
statPd that ::\Ir. Collins told her that l\Ir. Holbrook intended to build units on the duplex lot in discussing the
weaning of subordination with her at the time of her
signing of the earnest mone:· receipt. (R. 200)
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT IS DEFINITE AND CERTAIN AND CONSTITUTES A BINDING CONTRACT BETWEEN THE PARTIES.

Even a cursory reading of the Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (Exhibit P-1 and P-14)
amply supports the trial court's conclusion in his Memorandum Decision:
"That the contract ... was not too indefinite
but to the Court is absolutely clear and definite."
(R. 22)
rrhat such an Earnest l\loney Receipt and Offer of
Purchase can constitute a binding contract has been reJJeah.l{].J:· recognized by this Court. Bunnell i;s. Bills, 13
U.2d 83, :3G3 P.2d 597. Also see Johnson vs. Jones, 109

U. 92, l<i-± P.2d 893 for a di8cu"sion of a "prelirninar)·
agrel•rnent" for thL· sale of n•al et-ltate -..d1id1 was found
snfficiently definite to lw enforceable.
The problem here is not that the Eanmst Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase is indetiuite or ambiguous,
but, as revealed b_,. a revi(•\r of the entire course of conduct of the Defendants after lia,·ing signed said contract,
is a patent attempt to avoid compliance. Examples of
such conduct are the refusal to give occupancy of the
premises to tlw Plaintiff as required hy the agreement
and the continual submission of counter proposals, such
as those contained in Exhibit D-7 wherein Defendants
proposed such things as subordination of the duplex
only aft<-'.r payment of $15,000.00 on that property, the
right to approve any of the plans for improvements, and
the amount of construction mortgage, etc. Further examples are contained in Exhibit D-9 and the Uniform
Real Estate Contract and Addendum, Exhibit D-8, wherein, though the Defendant pays lip service to his willingness to perform the terms of the Earnest Money Receipt
and Offer to Purchase, he again insists upon additional
provisions such as, " ... that the
will not commit
any destruction upon the premises and according to the
Uniform Real
contract when the balance is down
to $100,000.00 we will still have a 'duplex' on the property." and "The Hodsons art' willing to subordinate any
time to a first mortgage at

6%, the proceeds of which

"-ill be paid over to them on account." (Exhibit D-8 and
D-9)
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The
attitude is continued to be expres:::;ed in
Exhibit D-11,
the manrn·r in which the removal of the
duplex and con:::;truction of the apartment building wa:::;
('.Olllrnenced during the time when the Plaintiffs were
away on a tri1J and by the failure to ever forthrightly
inform the Plaintiff, either in pernon or by his agent:::;,
that he wa:::; re:::;cinding the eontract or the tendering back
of tlw downpayuu·nt or relea:::;e of the Michigan property.
(R. 103, 108, 109.) Enlightening in this connection is
the
of Mr. Collin:::;, elicited by the Defendants'
attorney, covering indication:::; of Defendants' refusal to
perform. (R. 184, 187)
A:::; evidence of the w<>ight to be given to Mr. Hodson's testimony in this matter and for further light upon
his coursP of conduct, it is interesting to look in the record at the exkn:::;ive testimony on the question of whether
his initials appear on line 21 of Exmbit P-14. Mr. Hodson
has categorically denied initialling this deletion, while
.Jfr. Collins testified that he did so initial. Mrs. Hodson
testified that she did not see her husband initial it and
that the initials were not his. (R. 160, 142, 158, 203)
However, his testimony on this matter, as elicited by his
counsel at R. 150 is worthy of quoting.
"Well, when Mr. Collins brought this to our
place for n:::; to sign, this wasn't crossed out, and
just before he left, as if he remembered something, he pieked up the paper, and he :::;ays, 'Oh,
I forgot something,' and he crossed it out. And
I :::;an;
crossed out'?'
. ' 'Tell us what von
.
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And he
advantage that I

'\\'(•]], l think it
it out.'

to yom

<'1'088

And I :said, ·What?' l said. 'I noti('ed dO\rn
li('re 1 agT1: <·d to p11rclia...;e prieP if it i:s $150,000.00
'rhat is wltat l ha\'<' hct'n telling mu is the onh·
thing I am inkre:sted in, that I ·get $150,000.00
ont of thi:s lJlal'e, and l do11 't think Yon haY<'
worded thi:s thing
l initial
that'?'
1

And he :said, •If you want to.' And he said
'\Vould yon like to initial anything np here1'
And I :said I \rnuldn't initial anything. I
don't Imo\\· what had been cros::-;ed out. And I
·As long a:s that has been crossed out I won't
initial this other thing down here either.'"
In rellll'lllbering that l\Jr. Holbrook i:s a man of
a11d l:rn:sine:s:s experit>IH.'.t> (H. 1:25), said actions
in this regard lwcornt·
unbelil'veable. Ht> did
not demand a rdurn of tlH' papers hP had :signed from the
agent l\lr. Collin:.;, nor did he inform l\lr. Collin:s' emplo.v<•rs of their e111ployee ':s unauthorized aet, nor did
1H· inform the Plaintil'f that tlwre had been nnauthoriz('d
ehanges in the docmrn·nt lH' had :signed, nor did he ('Wl'
que:stiou the• elmngt' until t11e time of trial, (-'\'l'Il going so
far as to include the pro\·i:sions of tlw Earnest l\l01rny
Receipt and Ofivr to Pnrelia:se with the dektion in the
add<indnm to the ]n·opo:st>d Uniform Heal

trad,

D-8.

Con-
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is that the Defrndants, shortly after signing the Earnest
Heeeipt and Offer to Purchase, decided not to
eomply with tJ1p terms th(Teof, hut instead to adopt the
plans for the ns<> of tlit· pro1wrty originated by l\fr.
lfolbrnok and, thus, turn the matter to their advantage.
On the other hand, Plaintiff not only paid the down
paymPnt and attt>mpted to go into possession, but, as
concludt>d by the trial court, was ready, willing and able
to perform hi::; part of the agreement. See 17 AmJur.2d
Contracts,
page 800,
in discussing the manm·r and sufficiency of tender, it is stated:
" ... it means only a readiness and willingness
accompanied with an ability on the part of one
of the partie::; to do the acts which the agreement
require::; him to perform, provided the other will
concurrently do the things which he is required
by it to do ... "
POINT II
THE DAMAGES AWARDED ARE SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE, EXCEPT THAT THE AWARD
OF PROFITS SHOULD HA VE EXTENDED TO THE
TIME OF THE JUDGMENT.

rrhe Plaintiffs were denied ::;pecific performance of
thP contract because 8ellern, after breaching the agreeHH·nt by refusing to close the transaction and refusing to
del ive1· JH>88Pssion to the Buyers,

changed the

lll'Operty h>· moving the dnplex and Precting thereon a

8
/, 1wn)ic

/>e;/r11'!1u111c1,

1

/)(![/<'

"D<lrnag('S llla:,· iHj mrnnh·d to tl1e 1ila;i1tiH
\dlPl'(' tlte C'Olll'L in t]H•
o[ it:-; diserdioJJ,
refnses SJH'tifiC' pel'l'orrn<.l!l<'<' L<'('aUS(' oi' tJ1e gn•at
hardship of tliat l'eli<•f to tlt<' d<>i'<·rnlant . . . A
111wcial eqnit_v for n·li<·f L>· mi award of darnagt•s
ma.'· ahio he slt<nnt to exist \\·here tlt<• dcJ'<_,ndant
has acted in('quitalJly i11 tr.' ing to a\·oid a decfl'('
of spt•cifie i1erforman<.:e."
Th<·n· app<·<us to IH littl1.· q11estion tl1at th· Plaintiff
from DPfrndant\ breacJ1.

sufft>red substantial

Jn addition to losing· tli(' Jll'OjH'rt.\·, his $:20,UOO.OO do\\'11
pa_'l·ment remained in escrnw until the time of trial and
tlrns, tog< tl1<·r witJ1 tlw }Jrnpert_'I· in
\\'hich 1H·
had agT<''.•d to mortgage, ·was not avaiJalJ!e for other
\'Pnttnes. TliP gerwrnl rnle in an action for breach of
1

C'ontraet i::; tlmt the Plaintiff i::; normally entitled to
n"COH·r

Iii;; darnag<·s in an

\\·liid1 will plac<' him

as n<'<:HJ.,- as possible in th<' smiw po::;iti(ln ]ip \1·011ld hav<·

o<.:<.:upiPd if De fondant had pe rfornwd his eon tract obli-

ga t: on:-:; and tlies(· cbrnag('S illC'll1<1(• t11e
n•aso1iahl:,

(•.>:]JPtfrd

to rnnk(' from the euntract, that is,
'2:2 A111.Iur.'2d,

tl1<' lwrwfit ot' Ji,s bargain.

and -!:/, pa9es 7'2 tl1rm19l1 75.
719, l'cudrJ1· u11d P111'clu1.,1'J': R..
(l!Jlll

of gain8 ]]('

SPt>

also 11 ALB.-3rl

r·ocCi!J ,tor

l.1oss uf Profits

Co11! <Ji! lJ{!/t!'d /:)(tfe of Use of L(!!id, 1Vha!' f',,11clur

F ({ i Is u r Ue(11s1 s l () ( 'o 1111',I/.
r11/(l Puj'(){((.,l'r,

JHlf/1'

Ht'P

al so fl:) A 111J11r., V <"ncl1n
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''It is universally n·cognized that a vendor
who wilfnlly, and for
of his own, refuses
to perform his contract for the sale of real estate
may be held liablP to the vendee for the loss of his
bargain . . . lrrespedive of whether the court
follows tlH· rule limiting thP liability of the vendor
where
ads in good faith, the vendor is ordinarily liablt' to COllllH='rn:>atP the vendPe for loss
of the bargain ·where the executory contract fails
becamw the vendor, suhsequently to the execution
of the contract, disabled himself from performing
the contract."
And, fnrthPr, at 55 Am.J ur, Y t>ndor and Purchaser,
page 957:
"If a vendor in ddault acts in bad faith, the
vendee may recover all the damages he, has sustained by reason of the breach."
It is granted that a general rule of damages between
YPndor and n ndee, where the vendor refuses to convey,
is the market value of the 1n·o1Jerty at the time of the
hreach less the contract price to the vendee. However,
in the instant case, through the willful misconduct of
tlw Defendant, he ::;o changed the nature of the property
that an attempt to apply this rule would, for all practical
JHlrIJO::>es, be impossible; and to allow the Plaintiff to
n•eover
nominal damage::; would not only be unjust
to thP Plaintiff, bnt 1ronld be permitting the Defendant
to not only prevent specific performance of his contraet,
hut also to escape payment of damages because of his
own wrong and to profit thereby. 22AmJ1tr. 2d Damages,
1

page 24:
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"One w1JOSl' \\T<rngful conduct Jius rendend
difficult the a;:;certa1rnuent of the> pree :-c·
suffend by a vlai11tiH is uot e11titl<·d to rornplai11
that they rannot !iv rneasun·d with t1H• s<llll<-' exartness and lJrt>rision as \\·ot!ld othPn\·ise be lJOssibh·.
And some rases lia n· further held tlia t when tlw
. . . contract }Ji'eak<c>l' has caus<.·d th(• llllt<'rtainh·,
he will not be al101n•d to com1J1ain that the
ages cannot be rneasurPd \\·ith exactrn•::-;::-;."

ln E1;e11 Odd::i, Jue. cs. Xi, h.on, :2'.l L2d 4!1,
709,
wht>re the iwt valu(' of tht· orv taken was 1wld to be a
pro1wr rneal:llll"l' of damage .. .; rnther t11a11 to evalnate the
(•ntire mim· befort> and after
wrnugful taki11g of the
or<-', thi1:> court, at page 52, ::->tates:
"8peaking generally about damage::-;, the desired objective is to evaluate
loss :m±fered b.\·
the mo::-;t direct, lJractical and accurate method
that can be employed."
Again in Brerdo11 /'.'). Dixuu, 20 U.2d G4, 433 P.2d
;), the court, in disrus::-;ing the rontention that the only
proper measun• of damages wa8 the diff PrPnee in the
\·alw· of the land before and aftpr thP de::-;tniction of
trees, ::-;tatei:;:
"\Vl' are aware that in ap1Jropriate circu111stance8 this method of as8e88ing damages ha::-; been
approved in nmueron::-; cai:;es. But we do not
agree that it i:;J10nld lw the sole and exclusive
method of a8::;ei:;sing
damages in all circmnstance8. \Vhen property has been damagt>d or
destroyed by a 1rrongful act, the de8ired objectivt>
is to ascertain ai:; aecurately as po81:>ible th<:>
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amount of money that will fairly and adequately
compernmte tlw owner for his loss. Reflection will
reveal that a rigid adherence in all cases to the
rul<-> of the ,·alue of th1c• realty before and after
the injury would not always serve that objective
... In such a case application of the rule of value
of the realty before and after the injury would
rwnalize the owner by giving him less than his
true damage and confer an unjustified advantage
on the wrongdoer by permitting him to pay less
than the actual damage he caused."
Faced with this problem, it was well within the trial
court's discretion to arrive at an alternate method of
computing Plaintiff's damages as he did in this case;
and the method selected, that of utilizing the "rental
value" of a portion of the property would appear to be
a n·asonable alternative and one about which the Defendant should have no complaint when compared to the
granting of specific performance with its great hardship
on Defendant.
With regard to Defendant's contention that the
monthly amount determined
the trial court is not
supported
the evidence, suffice it to say that the trial
eonrt apparently adopted the figures as testified to by
.Jir. Holbrook (R. 107), though he well might have come
up with a higher fignre had he totaled the amounts for
both the apartment and the duplex on the listing agree111Pnts (P-2 and P-3) or a lower amount had he accepted
the figures on Exhibits D-17, 18 and 19. In connection
to note the
,,·ith these latter Pxhibits, it is
tt·stimony of Mrs. Hodson, wherein she admitted that
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tlj(se n'cords

not li<'r:· and tl1at sli(' wa:-; nnablt'
·. xplain th<> rneaning ol' till' i'igltn's or their ,..;ourcc·. (H.
1!J7)
\V('l'<'

Tlii:s court
state:s:

111 ]<.,'n'11

Ur!ds, l11c.

1,·.

Xi<

[,,;JJ1, :-;upru,

"\Ve han• no disagTe<:>ment with the proposition that the fact-trit•r should not be permitted to
arbitrarily
icrnore
COllllJt'knt ' credible and nncon•
b
tradicted evidenre. Ne\·ertheless, he is not bound
to slavishly follow the evidence and the figures
given by any particular witness. \Vithin the limits
of reason it is his prerogative to place his own
appraisal npon the evidence which impresses him
as credible and to draw conclusions therefrom in
accordance with his mvn best judgment."
Certainly then, the trial court was ·well within its
discretion in the method used in determining damages.
HO"wever, it is contended that, in computing the to·tal
amount to he m\·arded the Plaintiff for his "loss of bargain,'' the period slwnld have continued to the time of
the rendition of the trial court's judgment. This would
appear logical, since up to this time Plaintiff's $20,000.00
deposit n·maint'd in escro\\' and he was unable to nse
it or the
for other purposes. This
was necessary since, even though ht> might feel it unLkel\· that a court \\'Oltld award him specific performance
in view of tht' major diangt>s mad<• by th(-> Defendant on
tlte prn1H·rt:·, ::-;till the Dde11da11t had IWH'l' notifit>d him

tb1t the eontracf \\·a::-; l'<'S<.'.illd(->d, released him from his
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obligations therPunder, or tnHlPn·d a rdt>a::-;e of his do\\·n
payment in Pscrow. Cornwq11P11tl.\·, it was nec(•::-;sar_'I· that
Plaintiff maintain hi1wwlf i11 a position to perform the
(•ontract if eallt>d 11pon to do so; and, tlm::-;, his darnag<'s
contimwd to tlw tirnl' of the j11dgml•nt. 55 AmJnr. Vc11-

1lor a11d Purchaser,

page 959:

" . . . damage::-; ari::-;ing ::-;ubsequent to action
brought, or even to thP date of verdict, may be
taken into consideration when they are tlw natural
and neces::-;ary result of the act complained of, and
wlwre they do not themselves constitute a new
cause of action."
rrhe award of $1 G0.30 that Plaintiff expended in
lll"eparation is wpported h.\· the te::-;timony of Mr. Holhrook at R. 111 and is a proper award, a::-; is the award
of $-140.00, a::-; ::-;pt forth in the trial judge's

ernorandmn

Th·eision, for the washer and dryer placed in the Scarsdale. As to Defendant'::-; contention ·with regard to the
m_'l·sterious disappearance of the washer and dryPr, therP
is no such evidt>nce in the n•cord, tlw self-::;erving hearsa_'I'
report having been ::-;tricken. 55 AmJur, Vc11dur a11d Pitrrlws1·r,

page 958:
"Aliio, where the vendee in good faith is at
expense for invp::-;tigating the titlP, or for attornPYS fees, or other similar expense, and the conof sale fails, due to the fault of the vendor,
::;uch expenditures of the vPndee may be recovered
for, in addition to the general damages."

14
POINT III
THE APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS
NOT Tll\IELY FILED.

This rnatt(•r \\·as original!:· IJ\'fon· this eomt in civil
Xo. 11;)07, \\·J1erein Dd"<•mlants' origi11al appeal was di.-.:misst:•d. rrhe mattPr was again raised by Plaintiffs petition for an extra-ordinary writ Ko. I 171:) and on Plaintiff's motion to disrni;-;s appeal, (·ivil X o. 117()7, both of
\d1ieh were deniPd \rithout opinion and apparPntly for the
rPaso11 of prt>maturity, in that the matter C'Ould be and
\ms raised in Plaintiffs' eross-ap1wal. Consequently,
ratlwr than go into the· rnatt('r at great 1Pngth in this
brief, the court is n'qm•sted to ref Pr to and to incorporate
1u·rein tlw statement of facts rontained in Plaintiff's
motion to dismiss appeal, civil No. 117G7, together with
tl1e llH'lllorandurn of antl10rities filed thPrewith.
Briefly, hmn•v('r, Ddt:•ndant failed to file his motion
for a new trial within tl1e tillll' allowc"'d, \\·hid1, thus, did
not t('rrninak tlw nrnning of the time for appeal. Ht•,
tli\'IPaftt>r, failt>d to notirt• lllJ said motion for a ne\\·
trial, and thP issm· was raist>d some rnonths later by thl'
Plaintiffs' motion to strikt> tlw motion for a m··w trial.
Th·" trial <·ourt d(•Jli<'d tlw 1110tion to strik(•, denied th('
motion for a

1w\\·

trial, lint did, after the original appeal

was <lisrniss(·d, grant Defrn<lants' motion for rdief from
lat(• filing. rJ'lwn·after, tlit' trial ('Ollrt again dPnit•d Dt•motion for a rn·\\· trial, and t11is ap1H'al n•stdt-

ed.
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In \'Jew of the a11thorities prvviously snbmitted to
this court, it is doubted that the trial court had any
jurisdiction to grant relid' as was dom• here purportedly
undl·r l'HCP fiO(h) (1), <·\·•·n though then· is dieta to
the dfect that s11eh relief could he granted in a
tase in 111 re Hu11d.1/s Estate :241 P.:2d 4G2.
llo\\'<,nr, <'V<'ll if the Distriet Court had authority
and jurisdietion to grant n·lief from late filing, granting
s11ch reli<'f wherP the onl;.· gronnds are stated as the,
··111istakP and vxeuseahle llegl(•ct of the clt·rk," which consisted of the cl(•rk not ha\·ing mailed a cop;.· of the judg11wnt to tlw DPfrndants until three days after the judg!llent \Yas sigm·d and ent(•n•d and tlw "inadvertence and
1•xcust>ahle neglect of connsel," which, brit>fly stated,
<·onsisted of being overworked and too busy would be an
ahusP of thP eonrt's diserf:'tion and would eornpletely
n111lit\ till' pin·post>s of

t]H,

rules s1weifying times within

11·hieh rnotions for new trial and ap1)eals can be tak<:>n.
H<:>ganllPss of tht> nallll'S givt>n to the nuious motiom; iiffolvt•d ht>rein, the praetical d'fect of upholding
th!' lfo:.trict Court's aetion in this matter is to grant to
tit!' Distrid Co11rt 1mlirnited diseretion to ext<:>nd the
ti111p \\·ithin which appPals ma;.- lH' filed. If this is to lw
th<· law, tl1<•n the rules sho11ld lw changt>d to set forth
<'learl;.- that the trial eourt has eornplete diseretion to
<·xtPrnl the tinw for ap1wals, both

and after thP

Jl()rmal appl·<.d tiilll' has nu1, a rnost undesiraiJ[p result.
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Defendant:-:;' apprnl sl10nl<l IH' dismiss(·d as not
Yilt·d, and thus gin· lJl(•aning and dfrtt to tlw rnlPs co\·Pring appeals; and Plaintiffs, on their eross appeal,
::;l10uld be granted additional darnages computed to the
datt> of the judgment.
However, if thi:-:; appeal is 110t ::;o <li::m1is::-;Pd, then,
\\'h(•n viewing tht> e\·id('JlCt' in the light most favorable to
the prevailing parties, it is dPar there is substantial
eYidenct> to support tht> Findings aud Conclusions and
.Judgment of the trial court, t•xcept that the period of
tinw used in eornputing- t1H· amount of darnagPs to \vhich
Plaintiffs are entitll'd should have ht•en extt>ndPd to t1H"
date of judgml'nt; and, with this change, the judgment
s110uld be npheld.
Respectfully submitted,
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